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“Democracy is neither black nor red. Democracy is gray... chooses banality over 
excellence, shrewdness over nobility, empty promise over true competence...It is eternal 
imperfection, a mixture of sinfulness, saintliness and monkey business. This is why the 
seekers of a moral state and of a perfectly just society do not like democracy. Yet only 
democracy-- having the capacity to question itself -- also has the capacity to correct its 
own mistakes.... G-G-Gray is beautiful” 
  
   --Adam Michnik, New Yorker, December 9, 1996 
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I 
Introduction 
 
Another Panchayat election has been successfully performed this year by the West 
Bengal Government. This is particular mention because it is the only state in India where 
spreading up of power in the hands of common people has been regularly organized in 
every five years since 1978, when the left parties came into the power in West Bengal. 
The West Bengal Panchayat election, 2008 includes 49,140 people in the decision 
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making process in 3,220 Gram Panchayat; 8500 persons in 329 panchayat samities 
(middle tier) and 713 local politicians in 17 Zilla Parishad (upper tier) in the state. That 
is, in the state of 80,221,171 people, more than half lakh is being direct deceision taker 
regarding the basic needs of poorest of poor. 
But, striking is that, the ruling parties, especially the Communist Party of India (Marxist), 
that is, CPM, is facing an unprecedented dent in what it has been taken for granted, that 
is, its support in the rural West Bengal. The election result is also striking as, in past six 
successive elections, the coalition of left parties in West Bengal has been repeatedly re-
elected with an absolute majority, whereas other Indian states have witnessed incumbents 
losing elections regularly. But this time, the trickle of defeat during counting of 
Panchayat polls at the Zilla Parishad (District Council) level turned into a flood when 
results at the lower tiers emerged. (Exhibit1). 
So far the durable political success of the left in West Bengal is described by the 
economists as the ability of the government to combat rural poverty via land reforms and 
broad based distribution of benefits from development programs, rather than a strategy of 
‘clientelism’ which have favoured particular narrow groups to the exclusion of many 
others (Bardhan et al 2008). The state of West Bengal has been ranked third in 2005-06 
and also in 2006-07 by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India for its 
initiatives towards devolution. Richard C. Crook and Alan Sturla Sverrison, two 
researcher of England at the end of the decade searched out a new theory of 
interrelationship between erasing poverty and decentralization. Their research with the 
data of eight countries voiced the outcome that the positive relation between 
decentralization and development has only been observed in West Bengal. Other than 
these, from economic perspectives also, the state of West Bengal seems stable. The SRD 
Cell (Strengthening Rural Development) of Government of West Bengal has revealed 
that between 1973-74 and 2004-05, population below poverty line has come down from 
73.2 per cent to 28.6 per cent. That is, the rate of poverty reduction in West Bengal (44.6 
per cent) during this period is just after Kerala (46 per cent) 1. Not only that, during 1980-
1999, agriculture has grown at 6.5 per cent in the state which is highest among the states 
in India. During the same period, State Domestic Product (SDP) in West Bengal has 
increased almost eight times (Ghosh, 2008).  
 If it is taken for granted that the results developed by those elites are credible, then the 
present downfall of the ruling parties in recent Panchayat election seems ridiculous. To 
find out the actual reasons behind this twist, the issues of governance and development 
needs to be reexamined.  
In the present paper, attempt has been made to analyze whether the recent reforms in the 
panchayat system in West Bengal leads towards greater participatory governance in terms 
of greater devolution of power, finances and functions in the hands of common people 
and thereby providing an enabling environment for sustainable development and poverty 
reduction; or deepen the problem of clientilism in the banner of party, thereby 
constraining the path of poverty reduction. The paper is organized as follows. The next 
section sets out the context in which the issue of decentralization, democracy and 
development are discussed in West Bengal. Section III contextualizes the political, social 
and economic ways of Panchayati Raj in West Bengal. The next section, section IV 
moves on to the challenges being faced currently by the West Bengal Government in 
overcoming constraints to implement poverty reduction strategies through this 
decentralized structure. Finally the last section concludes the discussion. The focus of the 
paper is based on the hypothesis that the term 'decentralization' is never used in the true 
sense of its meaning. To a certain extent a mystery persists - the mystery of party, 
politics, supporters and opposers, the ism comes in. This is the ism of clientelism, which 
is dampening the path of poverty reduction in the state. 
 
 
II 
Democracy, Decentralization and development: Some Vital Concerns 
 
  The coupling of decentralization with poverty reduction is a relatively new 
preoccupation. Traditionally, decentralization was thought in relation to politics, to 
political sciences, and to the sphere of power play between centre and the periphery, 
whereas poverty reduction was relegated to economic growth and distribution. This 
arbitrary division is increasingly thought untenable for good governance by the political 
theorists and economists. Decentralization deepens the democratic process by engaging 
communities over decisions that shape their future, and by empowering them in the 
allocation of resources while holding accountable those that execute decisions on their 
behalf. However, the question is still pertinent whether the form of decentralization 
advocated and practiced leads to poverty reduction or whether this is a pure, but untested, 
presumption. Evidence on the effects of decentralization on community welfare, and 
specifically on poverty reduction, is not conclusive 1. Where decentralization is said to be 
accompanied by participation, empowerment, transparency and accountability, its impact 
its likely to be positive, as in that situation, it reduces cost of service provision and 
transaction costs. However, in other cases decentralization may not be a real transfer of 
power but rather an opportunity for politicians and power groups to capture power, and in 
extracting rent, at the sub-national level. Hence, when the effect of decentralization on 
development and people's well being is questioned, the primary concern is what precisely 
we mean by decentralization and what are the attributes that characterize this.  
Decentralization refers to “the transfer of political power, decision making capacity and 
resources from central to sub-national levels of government” (Walker, 2002). A number 
of arguments have been advanced to support decentralization including: 
Devolution: This involves transferring of political power and administrative autonomy to 
local government units with locally elected politicians. This system gives local authorities 
autonomy within clearly demarcated areas of decision-making through constitutional 
rights.  
Deconcentration: Deconcentration of the administrative system involves setting up 
region or district offices of the central ministries and other state agencies followed by 
delegation of work and authority from the centre to these local representations of central 
authorities. Thus deconcentration of the administrative system to bring operations closer 
to the people.  
Delegation. Delegation is a more extensive form of decentralization. Through delegation 
central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of 
public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central 
government, but ultimately accountable to it. Governments delegate responsibilities when 
they create public enterprises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation 
authorities, special service districts, semi-autonomous school districts, regional 
development corporations, or special project implementation units.  
Accountability: Local communities are better placed to influence politics and policy at 
the local level than at the national level. Communities can put direct pressure on local 
authorities if they are unhappy with the delivery of services. 
 
No doubt, the democratization through decentralization and empowerment of local 
administrative bodies can enhance participation among groups that have traditionally 
been marginalized by local political process. But, only participation through 
decentralization (i.e. 'access' to the decision making process) will necessarily lead to 
improvements in people's well being, is not entirely consistence with documented 
evidence. A sizable body of literature points out a week correlation between democratic 
decentralization and poverty reduction (Blair, 2000; Crook et al, 1998; Rahaman, 2001). 
Decentralization may pose new problems of co-ordination and planning. As the Kerala 
experience has shown (Ghatak et al 2002), too much devolution can lead to major 
duplication of efforts and gaps among different government agencies. Without adequate 
training and support, the devolution of large sums of money can also over burden local 
bodies whose members lack the expertise to spend large and complex budget (Bardhan, 
2002). Hence, there is no reason to argue that proper implementation of procedural 
democracy will surely reduce poverty and improve the index of development of a state2. 
That is, decentralization is not without its risks of the following: 
Elite capture: Devolution can lead to dominance by local elites and to regional 
imbalances between areas rich in rich resources and those poor in resources. It is 
therefore necessary to strike a balance between legitimate local interests on the one hand 
and legitimate national interests on the other. This balance can be effectively addressed 
through needs based revenue transfers from central to local governments.  
Revenue minimization: Local government may have limitations in their capacity to 
mobilize local financial resources, or be unwilling to do so; 
Corruption: More people have political influence under decentralization and 
consequently the risks of corruption may be higher; 
Weak administrative and management systems: The transfer of responsibilities and 
resources to local government requires effective and efficient administrative and 
management systems, which may take a while to develop at the local level. Too much 
deconcentration, in reality, increases centralisation, because, if effective, it extends 
control of the central authorities over local matters, which may result in frustrating 
people's participation; and 
Lack of participation: The decentralisation of resources and authority will not 
automatically result in more participatory and inclusive processes and topdown 
approaches to development may continue regardless. 
 
Hence, to capitalize the concept of democratic decentraqlization for development, we 
have to go beyond procedural democracy and question ourselves whether a 'quantitative' 
rise in the representation of people from lower tier in political decision making would  
 
Chart 1.1: Models of Democratic Decentralization 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democratic 
Decentralization 
Maintainace of 
constitutional 
obligations 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Rates of people's 
participation in 
decision making 
process 
Control Access 
Say of common 
people are getting 
proper importance in 
final decision taken 
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translate into 'qualitative' changes in the status of those people, thus paving the path for 
real political empowerment of the poorest of poor. Insurance of this depends on two 
different dimensions - access and control. Access indicates whether common people are 
participating in decision making process or not. Latter indicates whether their voice in the 
decision making process gets proper importance.  
 Actually, the prerequisites for effective decentralization are still emerging and are 
not altogether clear in their focus. For many analysts, effective decentralization 
invariably means that there is devolution of power and that participation, empowerment 
and accountability of communities is a measure on how successful the process has been. 
But should this be the sum totality of the expectations? Can we really have effective 
decentralization if the macroeconomic framework is inimical to economic growth and 
prosperity, that it is not pro-poor, if investment in health, water, sanitation and education, 
which are of vital importance to communities, is inadequate, and if there is no policy 
space for communities to operate? Participation and empowerment will sound hollow if 
illiteracy rates are high, with an added bias against women, if the macro stance implies 
usurious rates of interest that the poor cannot access, and if communities and civil society 
organizations cannot provide alternatives in the absence of markets. In the context of 
decentralized model implemented in West Bengal Panchayat, such considerations may 
appear significant to answer the very twist in recent Panchayat election result. 
 
 
III 
Democratic Decentralization and Development in West Bengal 
 
    Before 1977, West Bengal Legislative Assembly passed a 
series of Acts on Panchayat system consecutively in 1957, 1963 and 1973. However, the 
real journey of the Panchayati Raj system in West Bengal began under Left Front 
Government (LFG) in 1978. The experience of West Bengal under the Panchayat system 
stands in sharp contrast with that of other states and, together with land reforms, the 
Panchayat has been credited for playing an important role in the impressive economic 
turn-around of the state since 1980s. West Bengal is the first and only major state to have 
organized Panchayat elections on a party basis regularly in every five years since 1978. 
The Panchayati Raj system in West Bengal has won accolade not only from the scholars 
in India but also from the political theorists and economists abroad. The West Bengal 
Panchayat system has very often been considered as role model for the rest of the 
country. Primarily based on the experience of West Bengal, the Government of India 
passed constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 to give constitutional status to the Local 
Self Government (LSG). The 73rd Amendment Act initiated the journey of the ‘third 
generation Panchayat system’ in the country. So far, as the people’s participation3 is 
considered, West Bengal remains the pioneer in the context of creating a space for third 
generation Panchayat Raj system in all respects. In addition to the Gram Sabha, the 
Government of West Bengal has also made a provision for creating the gram samsad so 
that people can directly be involved in the decision-making process as well as 
implementing functions of the Panchayat. 
In spite of that, the rural West Bengal seems ominous with respect to development 
perspectives and it raises a serious question about the effectiveness of recent policies 
implemented in the Panchayats in West Bengal. The latest Annual Administrative Report 
(2006-07) of the Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West 
Bengal reveals that the state is still impaired with abject poverty, acute unemployment, 
low level of primary education and depressing indices of human development. Following 
the report, certain crucial observations are in order –  
1. Around ten million people in our state can not secure two squares of meals 
through out the year. Another two million are surviving with no mill a day in the 
worst affected districts of Malda, Murshidabad, Jalpaiguri, Purulia, Dakhsin 
Dinajpur, Uttar Dinajpur, Bankura and Paschim Medinipur. The Government 
report admits that around 16.5 per cent of the total state population are facing 
difficulties arranging two square of mill per day. To combat poverty, Government 
of West Bengal has identified 4,612 villages as backward and those villages are 
scattered among the 1,169 Gram Panchayat (out of 3,354 Panchayat in total) in 
239 block of the state (Exhibit 2).  
2. While overall schedule tribes population of the state is 5.5 per cent, those 
‘backward villages’ consist of 30 per cent of the STs population. Thirty two per 
cent of the total population of those villages are landless and 82 per cent of the 
remaining population depend on monsoon. About 45 per cent of the total GPs in 
West Bengal have irrigation facilities less than 40 per cent. In 1046 GPs, it is even 
less than 20 per cent.  With these, A wide disparity in BPL measures has been 
reported by the report4. 
3. Striking is that, in those villages, More than 60 per cent of those villagers have no 
job. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) is there to 
help the rural poor generate some income. In our state, per household availability 
of employment on an average has been only 14 days. The position is particularly 
poor in respect of Jalpaiguri, Murshidabad, Uttar Dinajpur, South 24 Parganas and 
Malda (Exhibit 5). Media reveals that Rs 650 crore remains unspent under the 
implementation of the programme (Anandabazar Patrika, February 03, 2008) 
whereas, 34.8 per cent of the GPs has been recognized as backward with a point 
that those village have no pucca roads (which can easily be implemented through 
NREGS programme). Not only that, according to government sources, the total 
amount already allocated and which was required to be utilised under various 
schemes before March 31, 2008 was more than nine hundred crores. That means, 
the wide list of development programmes could not be implemented and this may 
be due to lack of awareness, inadequacy of preparedness of the implemented 
machinery for which necessary collective measures was necessary (Exhibit 3). 
4. Apart from these pictures of abject poverty and malnutrition, aspect of primary 
education also seems quite depressing. The female illiteracy rate in the backward 
villages of eight districts is more than 70 per cent, while the overall illiteracy rate 
is less than 30 per cent for the state. Education up to primary level is impaired by 
the Sishu Shikhsa Kendra (SSKs). But the number of SSKs in the state has 
decreased from 16,054 numbers in 2005-06 to 16,117 numbers of SSKs, which 
functioned during the previous year. 
5.  From human development perspectives also, the rural West Bengal seems to be 
an underdeveloped state. The underweight childbirth, according to the recent 
report, is more than ten per cent in 2109 (62 per cent) GPs of the state. There is no 
percentage of children during the last one year born either in hospital or with the 
help of a trained birth attendant in 463 GPs of the state. In another 1934 (57.6 per 
cent) GPs, the said percentage is less than twenty per cent. In addition, the 
neonatal mortality rate, maternal mortality ratio and the infant mortality rate are 
still less than the national averages. 
 
Then what actually the Panchayat are doing in the state? It can safely be concluded that 
the recent poverty alleviation programmes implemented by the Department of Panchayat 
and Rural Development are continuously neglecting the issue of endemic hunger, abject 
poverty and acute unemployment. Not only that, there is wide regional variation in the 
implementation of those programmes. One reason behind this may be the low level of 
participation in the activities of the Panchayat. The departmental report admits that, in 
more than 68 per cent of the total Gram Panchayat in the state, average attendance rate in 
the last gram Samsad meeting was less than 20 per cent. Not a single GPs could manage 
even 50 percent of attendance (Exhibit 6). In 1523 GPs (45.41 per cent), the average 
attendance in last Gram Samsad meeting was between 12 to 15 per cent and in 767 GPs, 
it was even less than 12 per cent. Only 78 GPs around 40 percent of the people had 
participated that meeting. The participation rate in Block Panchayat is more depressing. 
In 230 out of 333 Panchayat Samities, no Half Yearly Block Samsad meeting was held 
(Exhibit 7, 8). Government is campaigning enough for participation. But people are still 
surviving with their belief that all those meetings are actually useless.  
Why? The recent studies in this respect have brought out some crucial explanations. The 
survey conducted by Pravat Datta in Birbhum and Jalpaiguri indicated that attendance in 
Gram Samsad meeting was only 15 per cent. Majority of the respondents in the study 
area felt that decisions of Gram Samsad had been taken earlier in the party office, they 
only endorsed them later. Another study conducted by Ghatak and Ghatak on twenty 
villages in South 24 Parganas reveals that the members present in the Gram Samsad 
meetings are mainly the supporters of the ruling party. Sachinanda Sau and Basubandhu 
Sengupta did and empirical study in Kharagpur II block of West Medinipur district of 
West Bengal on people’s participation in grass-root institutions of decentralized planning. 
The study shows that there has been a decline in the overall participation rate in Gram 
Samsad meetings. Debjani Sengupta and Dilip Ghosh based on their empirical study 
opine that “Gram Samsad meeting has failed to attract the village people not because they 
are less aware, but they are very much aware that attendance to Gram Samsad meetings 
will end just in killing of time”.  
 Presently, people's participation has emerged as a political slogan as it has become the 
pre-condition for development. Broadly, the people's participation in rural panchayat 
means their total involvement with its programme and activities. In democracy, the role 
of political parties is of utmost significance. It is termed as 'life of democracy'. It is the 
responsibility of the political parties to keep alive the spirit of democracy. In democracy, 
the political parties not only create the consciousness among the citizen, but, in fact, they 
also act as a weapon of working class to establish their rights. But in the research of those 
economists and political theorists, it has emerged that the whole operation of the 
Panchayat system in West Bengal during Left Front regime has been determined by its 
political strategy. This view has also been reflected in the research findings of scholars 
like Bandyopadhyay (1999), Webster (1999) and Bhattacharya (1998) that the CPM party 
has increasingly organized itself along strong democratic centralized lines. The party 
asserts a strong control over its members and supporters, including the members of the 
Panchayats. Those studies brings one unique conclusion that the affairs of the GPs are 
discussed by the local party members in closed door meetings and the elected supporters 
are then advised as to how party policy should be carried out through the GPs. 
 
 
IV 
Issues and Concerns about West Bengal Panchayat 
 
One lesson that West Bengal experience teaches is that little changes with the mere 
passing of a law. Although local self governments—to use the constitutional term—have 
come into existence, the conditions in which they can work effectively do not exist. The 
tasks that these bodies (GPs, PSs and ZPs) are to look after are not new tasks. Till now, 
there have been vertically integrated agencies that have been responsible for these tasks. 
For example, the Health Department has been running primary health centres; the 
Education Department has been running schools. Similarly, other departments have had 
their local presence and function. They have staff posted in every district and village, and 
a well established administrative machinery headed in the district by the Collector or 
Magistrate. They continue to work as before because the changes that brought in PRIs 
have not affected their functioning in any way. The district Collector still continues to the 
first citizen of the district, even though today the elected President of the district 
panchayat holds elective, but decorative, office. The delegation of administrative powers 
gives the Collector—by whatever name called—the powers of the government. It is he 
who can declare a district ‘drought hit’, not the elected President. He reports to the state 
government, not the locally elected official. He is charged with responsibility for law and 
order and controls the police. His promotions and postings are decided at levels above the 
district. This line of authority has not changed in the least with the arrival on the scene of 
the PRIs.  
There is opposition also from the NGO sector. As mentioned in the various reports of 
SRD cell of Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, the number of Self Help 
Group (SHG) has increased from 58,708 in 2002-03 to 1,78,050 up to February, 2008. 
Those SHGs have been shown as to empower the poor in a number of ways. First, they 
can connect poor and marginal people with a wider circle of allies, with whom they can 
mount a more effective political lobby.  They have been working in all parts of the state 
for many years now. They have been running schools, hospitals, credit groups and much 
more. They have been innovative; what they have done today, governments have taken 
up tomorrow. They have brought in ‘people’s participation’. Many of them are large, 
with capable staff and good funding. The sector has a good track record. They have 
begun to see the PRIs as rivals who are taking up their space. They argue that the PRIs 
are ‘political’ and hence necessarily out of tune with the problems of the poor, who need 
the guidance of those whose only agenda is poverty alleviation, not political 
advancement. This group sees the NGO sector as the local state—or a substitute for the 
state50, and the PRI as a ‘political’ interloper. That the PRI is democratically elected and 
representative, unlike the NGO, is neither here nor there. In a sense, this is a turf war5. 
Not only that, some electronic media, before Panchayat election raised the issue that 
SHGs are campaigning in favour of ruling party before election. That is, it can be 
concluded, they are also not free from clienlisism. 
The condition of the state finances deteriorated over a number of years and was 
acknowledged as being in crisis in 2003-04 budget statement. The statement admits that 
this crisis was not caused by low economic growth, but by the public sector pay raises 
and payment of pensions. With the majority of the budget absorbed by recurrent 
expenditure scope for poverty reduction activities was constrained. But intention of the 
Government was something else. As the sustenance and well-being of those state 
employees are derived from the state and its revenues, the ruling government successfully 
organized, controlled and disciplined these members to act as an extension of the party. 
The government and the employees' union have become two closely tied centers of 
power. This strategic use of constitutional democracy for the sake of the party came with 
resultant fiscal crisis, thereby ignoring the needs of poor in rural Bengal.  
By our pilot survey during panchayat election, it is found that the opposition parties or 
minority factions in the state stop attending the village council meetings or the public 
hearing, as they perceive that they cannot do much about the ruling party's spending of 
public funds that takes the form of widespread distribution of patronage. Sometimes 
whole of the villagers had expressed their agitation against the local ruling parties by not 
casting their votes in mass. This sometimes consolidates its electoral advantage.  
 
V 
By Ways of Conclusion 
 
A principal aim of this article was to explore the extent to which efforts at empowering 
and democratizing local political bodies have produced real and sustainable gains for the 
rural poor in West Bengal. The above findings paint a somewhat ambiguous picture of 
the lengths to which models of democratic decentralization can go in relieving endemic 
rural poverty in West Bengal. And these may throw some implication on the present 
unexpected result in West Bengal Panchayat Election.  
In one respect, they suggest that the correlation between democratic decentralisation and 
improvements in rural inequality and regional disparity has been relatively weak with 
respect to West Bengal Panchayat6. 
Such findings illustrate the limitations of using models of democratic decentralisation to 
alleviate poverty in rural areas. It is found that state government is unlikely to pursue 
substantive redistributive programmes unless ruling elites are ideologically and 
politically committed to the goal of poverty reduction. This, in turn, raises questions 
about the ways in which poverty, and therefore the need for poverty reduction, is 
articulated within West Bengal. A second area of concern touches upon the tension 
between increasingly participatory systems of governance and the needs of effective and 
coherent party politics of the rural elites. That is, the democratic decentralization model 
in the State allows access of people in the process, but people have no control in the final 
decision taken. The decisions are taken centrally by the party office.   
Clearly, therefore, democratic decentralization in the state of West Bengal, of its own, are 
not producing systems that are more effective or more accountable to local needs and 
interests. The formal mechanisms matter less than the informal institutions that underpin 
local political economies. And the understanding of it by the poor may have been 
reflected in the ballot box of Panchayat election. If 'only alternative of the left is better 
left', then the left strategy of democratic decentralization must have to be replaced by 
alternative model with more accountability, less corruption and abolition of those 
clientilsm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Notes: 
 
1.  See Vinod Vyasulu, Panchayats, Democracy and Development, Rawat Publishers, New 
Delhi, 2003, and Vinod Vyasulu, “Transformations in Governance in the 1990s: Some 
Reflections” Economic and Political Weekly, 5th June, 2004 for a detailed discussion. 
2.  See also “Decentralisation in India: Challenges and Opportunities”, Human Development 
Resource Centre, UNDP, 2000, for a clear statement of issues. 
3.  People’s participation is then implicitly pitted against representative democracy. This 
view can be seen in Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, India: Development and Participation, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi, 2002. See my review of this book, in EPW, “Development and 
Participation: What is Missing?” 13, August 2002 for an elaboration of this point. 
4.  “Below Poverty Line and “Above Poverty Line”—India’s poverty reduction 
strategy cannot do without acronyms and initials! See Vinod Vyasulu, Panchayats, 
Democracy and Development, Rawat Publishers, New Delhi, 2003, and Vinod Vyasulu, 
“Transformations in Governance in the 1990s: Some Reflections” Economic and Political 
Weekly, 5th June, 2004 for a detailed discussion. 
5.  See the review by Alok Sinha, “Decentralised Governance and NGOs” EPW, 31 March 
2001. 
6.  People’s participation is then implicitly pitted against representative democracy. 
This view can be seen in Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, India: Development and 
Participation, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                
List of Exhibits: 
 
Exhibit 1: Result of Panchayat Election in West Bengal (2008) 
Left Front Opposition Tier of 
Decentralization 2003 2008 2003 2008 
ZP 622 518 90 230 
PS 284 189 45 140 
GP 2303 1633 917 1463 
Note: ZP stands for Zilla Parishad (District Council), PS stands for Panchayat Samities 
(Block Council) and GP stands for Gram Panchayat (village council) of the three tier 
panchayat system in West Bengal. 
Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal    
 
Exhibit 2: Distribution of Backward Villages in Worst Affected Districts in West Bengal 
District No of Blocks 
No of 
Block 
consisting 
Backward 
Villages 
No of 
Gram 
Panchayat 
No of 
Panchayat 
consisting 
Backward 
Villages 
No of 
Backward 
Villages 
Percentage 
of 
Backward 
Villages to 
total 
Jalpaiguri 13 11 146 45 79 10.45 
N Dinajpur 9 9 98 92 760 50.53 
S Dinajpur 8 8 65 49 184 11.23 
Malda 15 15 146 114 602 33.46 
Murshidabad 26 23 254 103 242 10.45 
W Medinipur 29 24 290 173 637 7.32 
Bankura 22 22 190 151 569 14.05 
Purulia 20 20 170 150 994 37.05 
Birbhum 19 18 167 96 218 8.80 
Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal     
 
Exhibit 3: Person Days Generated per BPL Family under Various Wage 
Employment Programme in West Begal 
No of Days of Employment GP Percentage to total GPs 
25 days or more 343 10.23 
24 to 10 days 2154 64.22 
Less than 10 days 665 19.82 
Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal     
  
Exhibit 4: Progress of Receiving Nirmal Gram Puroskar by GPs in Worst Affected 
Districts 
District Total No of Gram Panchayat 
Nirmal Gram in 
2004-05 
Nirmal Gram in 
2005-06 
Jalpaiguri 146 0 0 
N Dinajpur 98 0 0 
S Dinajpur 65 0 0 
Malda 146 0 0 
Murshidabad 254 0 0 
W Medinipur 290 4 43 
Bankura 190 0 0 
Purulia 170 0 0 
Birbhum 167 0 0 
Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal     
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 5: Progress of NREGA in West Bengal during 2006-07 
District Employment provided Works completed 
Mandays 
generated per 
family 
Jalpaiguri 4,33,362 2,045 11 
N Dinajpur 4,92,674 3,496 10 
S Dinajpur 2,35,768 1,801 16 
Malda 2,42,237 680 13 
Murshidabad 6,15,642 2,077 8 
W Medinipur 6,14,360 4,048 16 
Bankura 7,28,999 1,239 24 
Purulia 6,55,150 1,263 15 
Birbhum 16,75,713 6,108 22 
Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal     
 
 
 
 Exhibit 6: Average Attendance in Last Gram Samsad Meeting in 2006-07 
Percentage of Attendance No of GPs Percentage of Attendance 
100-50 0 0.00 
50-40 78 2.32 
40-20 814 24.27 
Less than 20 2290 68.27 
Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal     
 
Exhibit 7: Average Attendance in Last Block Samsad Meeting in 2006-07 
Percentage of Attendance No of PSs 
Percentage of 
Attendance 
100-60 0 0.00 
60-40 170 51.06 
40-20 101 30.33 
Less than 20 62 18.61 
Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal    
 
  
Exhibit 8: Progress of Holding Block Samsad Meeting in 2006-07 
Total No of Block where 
Meetings held 
No of PS which did not 
hold any meetings 
No of Panchayat 
Samities 
Half-Yearly Annual Half Yearly Annual 
333 103 262 230 71 
Source: Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Government of West Bengal     
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